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Current Circuit Splits 
 The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by 
a federal court of appeals opinion issued between January 1, 2005 and 
March 31, 2005. This collection is organized first according to 
Civil/Criminal Matters, then by area of law. 
Each summary is intended to give only the briefest overview of a 
current split, not a comprehensive analysis.  Likewise, this compilation is 
by no means exhaustive, but will hopefully serve the reader well as a 
reference starting point. 
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CIVIL MATTERS 
BANKRUPTCY 
Due Process for Discharge - In Re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
In a creditor’s motion for relief from a bankruptcy court order 
discharging a debtor’s student loan, the court noted that an adversary 
proceeding is required before the debtor can be discharged from student 
loan obligations. Id. at 484. The court held that due process entitled the 
creditor to heightened notice of the proceeding as provided by Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 4009(d), and the creditor “was properly granted relief pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(4).” Id. at 487. The court joined the 4th and 10th Circuits 
in concluding that due process requires heightened notice. Id. at 486. By 
contrast, the 9th Circuit holds that heightened notice of the proceeding is 
not required. Id. 
Appeals of Section 363 Sales - Weingarten Nostat, Inc. v. Serv. 
Merch. Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2005). 
There is a split among the circuits as to whether § 363(m) of the 
Bankruptcy Code creates a per se rule mooting appeals absent a stay of 
the § 363(m) sale. Id. at 741 n.3. The majority of courts of appeal (1st, 
2nd, 5th, 7th, 11th, 9th and D.C. Circuits) follow a per se rule, holding 
that appeals of a § 363(b) sale are moot absent a stay of that sale pending 
appeal. Id. The 3d Circuit, however, has held that failure to obtain a stay 
pending appeal does not dispose of the case so long as a remedy can be 
fashioned that does not disturb the validity of the § 363(b) sale at issue. 
Id. The 6th Circuit avoided addressing the issue holding that, “even 
under the more lenient standard of the 3d Circuit, the relief sought by 
Weingarten would have disturbed the validity of the § 363(b) sale and 
assignment at issue in this case.” Id. 
Non-discharge of Debts -  In re Sicroff, No. 03-15610, 2005 WL 
665251, (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2005). 
In this case, the 9th Circuit addressed a circuit split regarding 
elements of a test under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at *5 n.4. While an 
arbitration judgment was being filed against him for defamation, Seth E. 
Sicroff filed for bankruptcy. Id. at *1. The 9th Circuit had to determine 
whether the arbitration judgment award was the type of debt that cannot 
be discharged under the Bankruptcy Code because it is “willful and 
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malicious.” Id. at *2 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2000)). As part of the 
test for malicious behavior, the 9th Circuit decided to take into account 
whether Sicroff’s actions were “without just cause and excuse.” Id. at *4. 
The circuit noted in a footnote that by doing this it was holding that the 
“just cause and excuse” piece of the maliciousness inquiry endured 
despite the Supreme Court case Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 
(1998). Id. at *5 n.4. The 5th Circuit had determined that Geiger 
disposed of the “just cause and excuse” element, but the 9th Circuit 
“disagree[d] with that interpretation, which was based on reasoning that 
conflates the elements of willfulness and malice in contravention of our 
clear precedents.” Id. 
Priority for Workers’ Compensation Insurance Premiums - 
Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 04-1136, 2005 
WL 674869, (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2005). 
In this per curiam opinion, the 4th Circuit elaborated upon a circuit 
split over whether workers’ compensation insurance premiums are 
“contributions to an employee benefit plan” under the Bankruptcy Code 
and, as such, get priority status under that Code. Id. at *1 (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2000)). The 9th Circuit had held that the statute at 
issue was “unambiguous” and that under its plain meaning, claims about 
such premiums concerned “contributions” and should get priority. Id. at 
*3 (citations omitted). According to the 9th Circuit line of reasoning, the 
statute on its face does not specify that “employee benefits plans” 
include only benefit plans that an employer decides to give voluntarily, 
as opposed to plans required by law. Id. Consequently, this side of the 
circuit split has held that “claims for unpaid workers’ compensation 
premiums, like those for unpaid health, disability, and life insurance 
premiums, are entitled to priority status under the Statute.” Id. 
Meanwhile, the 6th, 8th and 10th Circuits have held that the statute is 
ambiguous and have looked to its legislative history. Id. at *4. After 
examining the legislative history, these circuits have refused to award 
priority to workers’ compensation plans. Id. The legally-required plans 
do “not constitute a wage substitute” and are not “employee benefit 
plans” under the statute. Id. Two of the three judges on the 4th Circuit 
panel here sided with the 9th Circuit, finding that claims regarding 
workers’ compensation insurance coverage get priority as “employee 
benefit plans.” Id. at *6.  Of the two circuit judges, one found that the 
statute is unambiguous and “does not require that compensation received 
by an employee be a ‘wage substitute,’ nor does it exclude an employee 
benefit plan that is statutorily mandated.” Id. at *7. The second judge, 
however, held that the statute was ambiguous and required a look at the 
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legislative history before reaching the same result regarding workers’ 
compensation plans. Id. at *10-11. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Pendent Jurisdiction - Fafel v. DiPaola, 399 F.3d 403 (1st Cir. 
2005). 
The 1st Circuit, in an unpublished decision, undertook a dispute 
over the propriety of a dismissal of a state claim in a federal action 
involving pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 405-06. Pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. 
P. 68, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss his claims upon settlement. Id. at 
406-07. When the plaintiff attempted to litigate his claims further, the 
district court dismissed the actions, as per the settlement agreement. Id. 
In denying plaintiff’s request to reopen the proceedings, the court 
determined that “in protecting its Rule 68 judgment, the district court 
prudently confined its exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to the scope of 
the offer of judgment.” Id. at 415. This approach differs with that of the 
3d Circuit, which has found “similar language in orders of dismissal 
insufficient to incorporate terms of settlement agreements.” Id. at 413 
n.11. 
Timing for Service of Foreign Process - Nylok Corp. v. Fasterner 
World Inc., 396 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2005). 
In this case the 7th Circuit overturned the district court’s incorrect 
application of a 120-day requirement for service of process to a foreign 
party. Id. at 806. In so doing, the Nylok court noted a split with the 9th 
Circuit’s position of having no time limit on foreign process, instead 
noting “that the amount of time allowed for foreign service is not 
unlimited.” Id. at 807. 
Forum Non Conveniens - Dominguez-Cota v. Cooper Tire & 
Rubber Co., 396 F.3d 650 (10th Cir. 2005). 
This case presented the 10th Circuit with the question of whether a 
motion for forum non conveniens raised an issue composed purely of 
non-merits. Id. at 652. If so, a reviewing court would have “the discretion 
to evaluate [the] threshold ‘non-merit issue[]’ before ruling on subject 
matter jurisdiction.” Id. Otherwise, federal courts are obliged, “before 
proceeding with a case, . . . to examine the basis for their subject matter 
jurisdiction, doing so on their own motion if necessary.” Id. 
In reviewing the matter, the court noted that the issue had been 
reviewed by two sister circuits. Id. The 2d Circuit found that “because it 
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was not being called upon to decide a constitutional issue, it was not first 
required to pass on the question of jurisdiction before ruling on forum 
non conveniens, a creature of statute.” Id. The D.C. Circuit agreed, 
noting that “what is beyond the power of courts lacking jurisdiction is 
adjudication on the merits, the act of deciding the case,” and that a “court 
that dismisses on . . . non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens . 
. . makes no assumption of law declaring power . . . .” Id. at 652-53. 
The 10th Circuit disagreed with both circuits, finding that “the 
question of the convenience of the forum is not ‘completely separate 
from the merits of the action.’” Id. at 653. The court noted that the 
inquiry required in a forum non conveniens involves a number of steps, 
and “[i]n order to apply this analysis, the court must look at the particular 
facts of the case, and to this extent, it must reach the merits.” Id. at 653-
54. For these reasons, the court ultimately found that it was “unable to 
characterize forum non conveniens as a ‘non-merits’ issue akin to 
personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 654. 
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Empire Healthchoice 
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh ex rel. Estate of McVeigh, No. 03-
9098, 2005 WL 605777 (2d Cir. Mar 16, 2005). 
The 2d Circuit affirmed that there is a lack of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction in an action where a private administrator of a federal 
employee health plan sued the estate of a beneficiary employee. Id. at *2. 
In denying a petition to rehear an earlier panel decision en banc, the 2d 
Circuit noted the contrary position of the 7th Circuit, adopted shortly 
after the original 2d Circuit ruling that granted such jurisdiction for 
reasons the 2d Circuit had “addressed and squarely rejected in [its] 
original opinion.” Id. 
FEDERAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
Section 1983: Constitutional Violations by State Officials - 
Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548 (4th Cir. 2005). 
In a civil action for deprivation of property pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 (2000) the dissent opined that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Zinermon v. Burch 494 U.S. 113 (1990) controlled the case at bar. 
Bogart, 396 F.3d at 563 (Williams, J. dissenting). The dissent noted that 
there is a split among circuits as to the scope of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Zinermon. Id. at 565 (Williams, J., dissenting). Specifically, 
the dissent opined that the 4th Circuit has interpreted it broadly, 
concluding that the Zinermon Court had adopted the “governmental 
model” of determining liability for procedural due process claims under 
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§ 1983. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting). Under this model, “§ 1983 imposes 
liability for all constitutional violations committed by governmental 
actors in the scope of their employment….” Id. at 564. (Williams, J., 
dissenting). Alternatively, the 5th and 7th Circuits read Zinermon 
narrowly to retain the “legalist model.” Id. at 565. (Williams, J., 
dissenting). Under this model “§ 1983 imposes liability only if state 
lawmakers endorse a constitutional violation.” Id. at 564. (Williams, J., 
dissenting).  Ultimately, the court disagreed and held that the 
Parratt/Hudson doctrine controlled the viability of the plaintiff’s claim 
because the action of the state’s employee was random and unauthorized 
and because South Carolina afforded a meaningful post-deprivation 
remedy. Id. at 563. 
Constitutional Procedural Due Process: Unemployment - 
Whalen v. Mass. Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2005). 
In Whalen, the 1st Circuit ruled that a trial court clerk whose 
position was eliminated during budget cuts “had a right to the minimal 
procedural protections of notice and an opportunity to respond.” Id. at 
26. The 1st Circuit splits with “the D.C. Circuit [that] . . . held that due 
process did not require pre-termination hearings for more than 400 
teachers who lost their jobs in a reduction-in-force . . . even though the 
teachers were ranked in part by their principals based on performance.” 
Id. 
Federal Preemption: Airline Deregulation Act - Gary v. Air 
Groups, Inc., 397 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2005). 
On the issue of federal preemption of state whistleblower claims by 
the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), the 3d Circuit reversed the 
district court’s adoption of the more expansive 8th Circuit standard, 
instead siding with the newly drafted position of the 11th Circuit, ruling 
that the state law “retaliation claim is not preempted by the ADA.” Id. at 
190. 
Off-Reservation Tribal Activity - Praire Band Potawatomi Nation 
v. Wagnon, No. 03-3322, 2005 WL 681785 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 
2005). 
The Praire Band Potawatomi Nation issued motor vehicle 
registrations and titles for vehicles which admittedly may be driven off 
the reservation into the State of Kansas. Id. at *1. The State refused to 
recognize those registrations and titles. Id. The 10th Circuit disagreed 
with the 9th Circuit over the appropriate analysis for off-reservation 
tribal activity. Id. at *4 n.6. The 10th Circuit applied the balancing test 
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from White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 
(1980). Wagnon, 2005 WL 681785, at *5-6. By contrast, the 9th Circuit 
holds that when tribal activity takes place off-reservation, no balancing 
test is necessary and the tribe is subject to non-discriminatory state law. 
Id. at *4 n.6 (citations omitted). 
IMMIGRATION 
Asylum Protection - Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005). 
In a case concerning the requirements for asylum protection for 
foreign citizens, the 3d Circuit concluded that “two isolated criminal 
acts, perpetrated by unknown assailants, which resulted only in the theft 
of some personal property and a minor injury, is not sufficiently severe 
to be considered [the required] persecution.” Id. at 536. In so doing, the 
3d Circuit refused to adopt the 9th Circuit’s less stringent “‘disfavored 
group’ category” for granting asylum. Id. at 538. 
Retroactive Application of IIRIRA - Faiz-Mohammad v. 
Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2005). 
In Faiz-Mohammad the 7th Circuit recognized two splits while 
deciding whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) could be applied retroactively to an 
otherwise naturalized immigrant. Id. at 800. The Faiz-Mohammad court 
first rejected the position of the 6th and 9th Circuits that Congress 
intended that the IIRIRA not be applied retroactively, instead following 
the 3d, 4th, 5th, 8th and 11th Circuits in holding “that there is no clear 
indication of Congress’s intent regarding the provision’s retroactive 
effect.” Id. at 803. Faiz-Mohammad, an illegal immigrant who had been 
previously removed, reentered the country and married a United States 
citizen before the passage of IIRIRA. Id. at 800. The 7th Circuit declined 
to agree with the position of the 4th Circuit that there would be “no 
impermissible retroactive effect because the illegal reentrant could have 
applied for adjustment of status before IIRIRA’s enactment.” Id. at 807. 
It instead joined with the 8th Circuit in holding that since the defendant 
“had reentered the United States and married a United States citizen prior 
to IIRIRA’s effective date, [the statute] . . . could not operate 
retroactively to deprive him of the right to apply for that discretionary 
relief.” Id. 
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
ERISA: Protected Activities - Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 
No. 03-9186, 2005 WL 700951 (2d Cir. Mar. 28, 2005). 
Plaintiff Nicolaou was fired from her position with the defendant 
after bringing various potential violations of ERISA to the attention of 
the President of Horizon. Id. at *1. Reversing the district court’s 
dismissal for not being a protected activity under ERISA, the 2d Circuit 
held that while the meeting with the President of Horizon was not a 
formal proceeding it was a protected activity. Id. at *1, *4. The 2d 
Circuit believed that this was in line with the 4th Circuit precedent. Id. 
(citing King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
The Nicolaou court did, however, disagree with the 4th Circuit in its 
basis for that decision. Id. While the King court based its holding on the 
phrase “testify or about to testify” the Nicolaou court derived its 
interpretation from “the respective meanings of the terms ‘inquiry’ and 
‘proceeding,’ not the juxtaposition of those terms with any reference to 
testimony.” Id. at *4 n.3. 
ERISA: Standing Requirements - Milofsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
No. 03-11087, 2005 WL 605754 (5th Cir. Mar 16, 2005). 
In affirming the dismissal of an ERISA action brought by plan 
participants, the 5th Circuit noted differences with the 6th Circuit on the 
requirements for bringing an action. Id. at *5-6. The 5th Circuit finds no 
standing in cases having only “particularized harm targeting a specific 
subset of plan beneficiaries, with claims for damages to benefits 
members of the subclass only, and not the plan generally.” Id. at *7. The 
court noted that quite to the contrary, the 6th Circuit has found “that a 
subclass of [p]lan participants may sue for a breach of fiduciary duty.” 
Id. at *10 (quoting Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1453 (6th Cir. 
1995)). 
IDEA: “Prevailing Party” Status and Attorneys’ Fees - Smith v. 
Fitchburg Pub. Schs., 401 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2005). 
This case presented the 1st Circuit with the issue of the precise 
definition of “prevailing party,” as such status grants the party the right 
to reasonable attorneys’ fees under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”). Id. at 21-22 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) 
(2000)). 
The controlling case in this matter, Buckhannon v. West Virginia 
Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), held that a 
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party is only conferred “prevailing” status where there is a “material 
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,” and there is “judicial 
imprimatur on the change.” Smith, 401 F.3d at 21-22 (citing 
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05). The Court went on to note that it had 
previously “only awarded attorney’s fees where the plaintiff ha[d] 
received a judgment on the merits or obtained a court-ordered consent 
decree.” Id. at 22. 
The disagreement among the circuit courts stems from the Court’s 
statement on “judgments on the merits” and “consent decrees,” and 
whether the Court intended for only those forms of success to confer 
“prevailing party” status. Id. at 22-23. The majority of the circuit courts, 
including the 2d, 7th, and 4th, hold that Buckhannon does not limit 
“prevailing party” status to judgments on the merits and consent decrees. 
Id. (citations omitted). The 8th circuit is currently the only circuit court 
in disagreement, reading Buckhannon as a clear statement “‘that a party 
prevails only if it receives either an enforceable judgment on the merits 
or a consent decree.’” Id. at 23 (citations omitted). 
The 1st Circuit ultimately found that it did not need to answer the 
question left by Buckhannon, due to the facts of the case before them. Id. 
at 23-24. 
RICO: Disgorgement of Profits - United States v. Phillip Morris 
USA Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
In an action to recover health care expenditures paid by the 
government for tobacco related illnesses, the government, pursuant to the 
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1964(a) (West 2005), sought the disgorgement of profits. Id. at 1197.  
The court held “that the language of § 1964(a) and the comprehensive 
remedial scheme of RICO preclude disgorgement [of profits] as a 
possible remedy.” Id. By contrast, the court noted that the 2nd Circuit 
holds that disgorgement is available under § 1964(a). Id. at 1193. 
Social Security: Evidence in Appeals - Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 
No. 04-10197, 2005 WL 730577 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2005). 
Plaintiff Higginbotham appealed the decision of the Social Security 
Commissioner denying him supplemental security income. Id. at *1.  
Higginbotham argued that the Commissioner should consider evidence 
that was first submitted not to the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter 
“ALJ”) but to the Appeals Council, which denied his petition for review. 
Id. The Higginbotham court identified a split among the circuits about 
whether the district court must consider such evidence as part of the 
Commissioner’s “final decision.” Id. at *2. The 3d, 6th, 7th and 11th 
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Circuits have held that denial of review by the Appeals Council excludes 
any new evidence introduced there and includes only the record before 
the ALJ. Id. at *2 (citations omitted). The 2d, 4th, 8th, 9th and 10th 
Circuits have ruled that evidence submitted for the first time to the 
Appeals Council does constitute part of the final decision and therefore 
should be considered by the district court. Id. (citations omitted). The 5th 
Circuit joined this group of circuits and held that the district court must 
consider evidence introduced for the first time at the Appeals Council. 
Id. at *3. 
Telecommunications Act: Statutory Interpretation - MetroPCS, 
Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
In this case, the 9th Circuit noted several different splits among the 
courts of appeals, all in the realm of telecommunications regulation. 
The first split involved the “in writing” requirement of the 
Telecommunications Act (“TCA”), which declares that “[a]ny decision 
by a State or local government . . . to deny a request to place, construct, 
or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing.” 42 
U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (West 2005). In MetroPCS, the plaintiff, a 
wireless telecommunications service provider, submitted (and was 
denied) an application to the City to install antennas on an existing light 
pole on the roof of a parking garage. MetroPCS, 400 F.3d 715 at 718-
719. The court noted that two district courts in the 2d Circuit and one 
district court in the 7th Circuit require “local governments [to] explicate 
the reasons for their decision and link their conclusions to specific 
evidence in the written record.” Id. at 721. The MetroPCS court noted 
that the 4th Circuit’s position is directly opposite the district courts in the 
2d and 7th Circuits in that it applies a “strict textualist approach to hold 
that merely stamping the word ‘DENIED’ on a zoning permit application 
is sufficient to meet the TCA’s ‘in writing’ requirement.” Id. at 721-722. 
The MetroPCS court then noted that the 1st and 6th Circuits take a 
middle position, “requiring local governments to ‘issue a written denial 
separate from the written record’ which ‘contain[s] a sufficient 
explanation . . . to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the 
record supporting those reasons.’” Id. at 722. (quoting S.W. Bell Mobile 
Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). Ultimately, the 
MetroPCS court sided with the 1st and 6th Circuits, adopting the Todd 
standard. Id. at 722-23. 
Another split the MetroPCS court identified involved another TCA 
provision regarding what constitutes a “general ban” on wireless 
services. The court noted that the 4th Circuit holds “that only ‘blanket 
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prohibitions’ and ‘general bans or policies’ affecting all wireless 
providers count as effective prohibition of wireless services under the 
TCA.” Id. at 730 (quoting AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 
155 F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998)). The 1st Circuit takes a broader 
approach, which the MetroPCS court adopted by finding that the 
“prohibition analysis is . . . not limited to blanket bans or general policies 
prohibiting wireless services. Id. at 731. 
Related to the “general ban” disagreement, the MetroPCS court 
noted that “a locality can run afoul of the TCA’s ‘effective prohibition’ 
clause if it prevents a wireless provider from closing a ‘significant gap’ 
in service coverage” and thereafter the court declares that “there is a 
clear circuit split as to what constitutes a ‘significant gap’ in coverage.” 
Id. The 2d and 3d Circuits follow the “one provider” rule, which holds 
that “if any single provider offers coverage in a given area, localities may 
preclude other providers from entering the area.” Id. By contrast, the 1st 
Circuit “rejected the ‘one provider’ rule and held that a local regulation 
creates a ‘significant gap’ in service . . . if the provider in question is 
prevented from filling a significant gap in its own service network.” Id. at 
732. The district court in MetroPCS followed the 1st Circuit approach, 
which the 9th Circuit affirmed on this issue without specifically 
endorsing the 1st Circuit line of reasoning. Id. at 732-33. 
The MetroPCS court identified yet another split regarding the 
showing a wireless provider must make with respect to the intrusiveness 
or necessity of its proposed means of closing an identified “significant 
gap.” Id. at 734. The 2d and 3d Circuits “require the provider to show 
that ‘the manner in which it proposes to fill the significant gap in service 
is the least intrusive on the values that the denial sought to serve.” Id. 
(quoting APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Township, 196 F.3d 469, 
480 (3d Cir. 1999)). By contrast, the 1st and 7th Circuits hold that there 
must be “‘no alternative sites which would solve the problem.’” Id. 
(quoting Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 
620, 635 (1st Cir. 2002). Ultimately, the MetroPCS court adopted the 
“least intrusive means” standard of the 2d and 3d Circuits. Id. at 735. 
Title VII Employment Discrimination: Hostile Work 
Environment - Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 
2005). 
In this case involving a Title VII employment discrimination suit by 
a city employee, the 1st Circuit noted that “the weight of authority 
supports the view that . . . the creation and perpetuation of a hostile work 
environment can comprise a retaliatory adverse employment action,” 
citing the 2d, 4th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits as support. Id. at 89. 
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But the court noted that the 5th and 8th Circuits hold “that a hostile work 
environment cannot constitute a retaliatory adverse employment action; 
instead, retaliation requires an ‘ultimate employment decision . . . such as 
hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting and compensating.’” Id. 
(quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 
1997)). Ultimately, the 1st Circuit held “explicitly that a hostile work 
environment, tolerated by the employer, is cognizable as a retaliatory 
adverse employment action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a),” 
thus siding with the majority of the circuits and against the 5th and 8th 
Circuits. Id. 
Trademark Infringement: Standard of Review - Adventis v. 
Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., Nos. 04-1405, 04-1411, 2005 WL 
481621 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2005). 
In an unpublished opinion, the 4th Circuit, presented with a 
trademark infringement dispute, noted a circuit split regarding whether a 
“likelihood of confusion between the marks” constituted a factual 
determination or a mixed fact and law determination. Id. at *2 n.3. The 
court noted that the Federal Circuit determines ‘likelihood of confusion’ 
as “‘a question of law based on finding of relevant underlying facts,’” id. 
(quoting In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)), and that the 6th Circuit reviews underlying factual findings for 
clear error, but “likelihood of confusion” de novo. Id. The Adventis court 
also cited Justice White’s dissent from a denial of certiorari in 
McMonagle v. Northeast Women’s Center, Inc., 493 U.S. 901 (1989), id., 
in which the Justice noted the circuit split regarding the proper standard 
of review for the “likelihood of confusion” question. McMonagle, 493 
U.S. at 904 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Last, the 
Adventis court cited a 10th Circuit decision in which the court declared in 
a footnote that the parties to that case did not dispute the facts, “[w]ith 
the sole exception of likelihood of confusion,” and then the 10th Circuit 
declared that it would draw the “underlying facts used to determine 
likelihood of confusion[] from the record,” creating some uncertainty as 
to whether the 10th Circuit considers the question one of fact or law. 
Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 553 n.2 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
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CRIMINAL MATTERS 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Elements of a Retaliatory Prosecution Claim - Izen v. Catalina, 
398 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2005). 
Izen alleges that Catalina launched a sting operation in connection 
with possible money laundering and prosecuted him in retaliation for his 
history of representing criminal tax defendants. Id. at 9. All circuits agree 
that there are three requirements a plaintiff must prove in order to 
establish a retaliatory prosecution claim: (1) they were engaged in 
constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendants’ actions caused 
them to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness 
from continuing to engage in that activity, and (3) the defendants’ 
adverse actions were substantially motivated against the plaintiffs’ 
exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. Id. at 10 (citing Keenan v. 
Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002)). The 2d, 3d, 5th, 8th, and 11th 
Circuits mandate that the plaintiff prove an additional fourth 
requirement: an absence of probable cause to prosecute. Id at 12 n.7. The 
6th, 7th, 10th and D.C. Circuits do not require a lack of probable cause to 
prosecute to succeed in a claim for retaliation. Id. 
Motion to Dismiss an Indictment - United States v. Flores, No. 
04-20109, 2005 WL 603073 (5th Cir. Mar. 16, 2005). 
In this case the 5th Circuit was presented with the threshold issue of 
whether, when considering a motion to dismiss an indictment, a court 
may “look beyond the face of the indictment and rule on the merits of the 
charges pretrial.” Id. at *2. 
The majority of circuit courts, the 3d, 8th, 9th, and 11th, find that a 
court may not look beyond the fact of the indictment as doing so is 
effectually granting summary judgment to the party bringing the motion. 
Id. at *2 n.7 (citations omitted). The only circuit court to disagree is the 
6th Circuit. Id. 
The 5th Circuit followed the majority of the circuit courts, finding 
that a reviewing court may rule upon the merits of a case during a pretrial 
motion. Id. at *2. 
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FRAUD 
Government Agencies as Victims - United States v. Milstein, 401 
F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2005). 
In this case concerning the distribution of falsely branded 
prescription drugs with the intent to defraud, the 2d Circuit joined the 
10th and 11th Circuits in “holding that a defendant may be convicted on 
evidence that government agencies were the subject of the intent to 
defraud.” Id. at 69. The court noted that the 5th Circuit has expressed 
“doubt that government agencies could be victims of intent to defraud.” 
Id. at 69-70. 
IMMIGRATION 
Hypothetical Felony - Liao v Rabbett, 398 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
The 6th Circuit in Liao joined a majority of circuits by adopting 
“the ‘hypothetical felony’ approach in immigration cases to determine 
whether a state drug conviction is a ‘drug trafficking crime’ and 
therefore an ‘aggravated felony’” that allows removal. Id. at 391. In so 
holding, it brought its position in line with that of the 2d, 3d and 9th 
Circuits. Id. The decision noted the 5th Circuit has “rejected the 
proposition that interpretation of the phrase ‘drug trafficking crime for 
purposes of [21 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(43)(B) could differ depending on the 
context in which it arose.” Id. at 392-93. 
Relevance of Deportation Hearing - United States v. Torres, 383 
F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004). 
The 3d Circuit reviewed the conviction of an illegal alien for 
unlawful entry into the country after the defendant had been convicted of 
previous crimes while in the United States. Id. at 94. Torres claimed that 
his prior deportation proceedings were flawed and that he was denied 
discretionary relief in his 1998 deportation proceedings, pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(c). Id. at 95. This claim was based on the Supreme Court 
ruling in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). The court, in determining if 
Torres’ hearing had been “fundamentally unfair,” reviewed other 
circuits’ holdings in the wake of the St. Cyr decision. Torres, 383 F.3d at 
103. The 9th Circuit held that if defendant’s removal hearing was 
constitutionally inadequate, the removal could not be a basis for 
subsequent convictions. The 4th, 5th, 7th, and 10th Circuits hold 
otherwise, applying a “reasonable likelihood” test to determine if a 
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deportation hearing, if offered, would have changed the result. The 3d 
Circuit affirmed judgment for Torres, relying on the majority view of the 
circuits. Torres, 383 F.3d at 106. 
Reopening of Deportation Proceeding - Barrios v. Attorney Gen. 
of the United States, 399 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2005). 
The 3d Circuit, in an unpublished decision, reviewed a deportation 
proceeding for an illegal alien who married an American citizen 
following a court-ordered deportation. Id. at 272-73. Defendant Barrios 
filed a motion to reopen his immigration case, but the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied his request. Id. at 273. 8 U.S.C. § 
1252b(e) prohibits an alien for applying for an adjustment of 
immigration status for five years, absent “exceptional circumstances.” Id. 
at 273-74. The 9th Circuit “held that the mere filing of a motion to 
reopen [did] not constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’ within the 
meaning of the statute.” Id. at 275 (quoting Shaar v. INS, 141 F.3d 953, 
957 (9th Cir.1998)). The 3d Circuit agreed with the dissent in the 9th 
Circuit case that “the failure of the immigration authorities to act on a 
legitimate application for relief filed within the voluntary departure 
period [wa]s an exceptional circumstance ‘beyond the control of the 
alien.’” Id. at 277. As a result, the court found that the Barrios’ family 
situation warranted him receiving a hearing on his motion to reopen. Id. 
at 278. 
Retroactivity of Bar to Relief - Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 
F.3d 881 (2005) 
This case presented the 10th Circuit with the issue of whether the 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5)’s bar to relief is 
impermissibly retroactive when applied to an immigrant deported prior 
to the bar’s effective date. Id. at 886-87. 
The court notes that there is a three step test to be used when 
determining whether § 241(a)(5) may be applied retroactively: (1) The 
court must determine whether retroactive effect has been expressly 
prescribed by Congress; (2) where there is no express language, the 
“normal rules of statutory construction” are used to “ascertain the 
statute’s temporal scope”; and (3) if congressional intent cannot be 
ascertained, the court considers “whether the statute has retroactive effect 
. . . . If a retroactive effect exists, it triggers the traditional judicial 
presumption against retroactivity and the new law will not be applied.” 
Id. at 887. It is consideration of the second prong of this test that has 
resulted in a division among the circuits. 
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The 9th and 6th Circuits take the minority position, holding that 
“Congress unambiguously intended for INA § 241(a)(5) to be applied 
only to previously deported aliens who re-entered the country after the 
effective date of the statute.” Id. at 888 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). In sharp contrast, the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 8th and 11th Circuits have 
determined that “application of the normal rules of statutory construction 
does not reveal unambiguous congressional intent as to the temporal 
scope of INA § 241(a)(5).” Id. (citations omitted). The 10th Circuit 
ultimately sided with the majority position, finding that “Congress’s 
failure to expressly state that the reinstatement statute applied to aliens 
who re-entered the country prior to its effective date, does not mean 
Congress therefore unambiguously intended for the statute not to apply 
to these aliens.” Id. at 890. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
DNA Act - United States v. Sczubelek, No. 03-2173, 2005 WL 
638158 (3d Cir. Mar. 21, 2005). 
This case presented the 3d Circuit with the question of whether the 
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (DNA Act), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 14135-14135e, is constitutionally valid under a Fourth Amendment 
analysis. Id. at *1. The DNA Act requires certain individuals entwined 
within the criminal justice process to give DNA samples for entry into a 
national database. Id. at *5. 
Although circuit courts presented with the same issue have 
unanimously upheld the statute, they are split in their application of two 
standards: (1) the Knights reasonableness standard, or (2) the Griffin 
special needs exception. Id. at *8. The 4th, 5th, 10th and 9th Circuits 
have utilized the reasonableness standard, which requires an examination 
of “the totality of the circumstances” when considering whether a search 
is conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at *7-8 (citing 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). The 2d and 7th 
Circuits have utilized the special needs exception, which holds that 
“special needs” make it “unnecessary to consider whether warrantless 
searches of probationers were otherwise reasonable within the Fourth 
Amendment.” Id. at *7-8 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The 3d Circuit took the position of the majority of the circuits, 
applying the Knights reasonableness test, finding it “appropriate to 
examine the reasonableness of the taking of the sample under the more 
rigorous Knights totality of the circumstances test rather than the Griffin 
special needs exception.” Id. at *8. 
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DNA Collection - Padgett v. Donald, No. 03-16527, 2005 WL 
503312 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005). 
In this 2005 unpublished case, the 11th Circuit reviewed a Georgia 
statute which required convicted felons to submit DNA testing for a state 
database. Id. at *1. Defendant attacked the statute as unconstitutional, 
and sought an injunction to prevent the collection and analysis of his 
DNA sample. Id. at *2. In upholding the statute, the court noted a split 
among the circuits for review of such DNA collection laws. Id. at *3. 
The 2d, 7th, and 10th Circuits undertook a balancing test only after 
“finding that the statute served a special need beyond general law 
enforcement.” Id. The 4th, 5th, and 9th Circuits applied a balancing test 
without finding any special need, a standard less-friendly to defendants. 
Id. The 11th Circuit followed the lead of the 2d, 7th, and 10th Circuits, 
and employed a balancing test which weighed the individual’s privacy 
interest against the state’s legitimate interests, basing its decision on the 
“totality of circumstances.” Id. at *5. Under this standard, the court 
found that the statute did not violate the defendant’s rights to be free of 
unreasonable search and seizure. Id. 
Federalism - United States v. Becerra Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
In a criminal proceeding, the court considered “whether state or 
federal law govern[s] the reasonableness of seizures.” Id. at 1173. The 
court declared “that the reasonableness of a seizure depends exclusively 
on federal law.” Id. The court reasoned that the “weight of authority 
establishes that the test of whether a search or seizure ‘is one of federal 
law, neither enlarged by what one state court may have countenanced, 
nor diminished by what may have colorably suppressed.’” Id. (quoting 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1967)). Thus, the 9th Circuit 
concurred with at least the 4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits. Id. By contrast, the 
2nd, 7th, and 10th Circuits consider state law when adjudicating the 
reasonableness of searches and seizures. 
SENTENCING 
Enhancement for Flight - United States v. Southerland, No. 03-
11319, 2005 WL 729469 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2005). 
This case required the Fifth Circuit to address a circuit split 
concerning the federal sentencing guidelines. See id. at *3. The 
defendant pled guilty to bank robbery and access device fraud and had 
his sentence increased due to reckless endangerment during flight. Id. at 
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*1. Addressing the question of whether a causal nexus is required 
between the flight and the underlying crime, the Southerland court noted 
that the 9th Circuit had assumed that such a nexus must exist and that the 
underlying offense caused the reckless flight. Id. at *3 (citing United 
States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1994)). In unpublished opinions 
the 6th and 10th Circuits, however, have declined to hold that a nexus is 
required. Id. at *4 (citations omitted). The 5th Circuit declined to follow 
either approach, holding that while a nexus was required for an increased 
sentence due to reckless flight, there need not be causation as required by 
the Ninth Circuit. Id. at *4. 
Guidelines: Statutory Interpretation - United States v. Edwards, 
397 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005). 
This case presented the 7th Circuit with the question of whether the 
distinction between crack and cocaine base was meaningful for purposes 
of enhanced penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000). Id. at 
571. The court noted a “significant division among the circuits on this 
issue.” Id. at 575. The Edwards court identified the 4th, 8th and 11th 
Circuits as holding “that the mandatory minimum sentence under the 
statute applies only to crack.” Id. The court noted that the 6th Circuit 
“appears to have reached the conclusion that ‘cocaine base’ . . . means 
crack[,] . . . but the [6th Circuit] simply assumed that cocaine base and 
crack are equivalent in all senses.” Id. The court also noted that the 9th 
Circuit’s interpretation “includes[,] but might not be limited to crack.” 
Id. The D.C. Circuit takes a middle ground approach, declaring “that the 
term ‘cocaine base’ should [not] be read literally to include anything that 
chemically constitutes base cocaine, but [it] has declined to adopt the 
‘crack only’ definition.” Id. Still others, namely the 2d, 3d, 5th and 10th 
Circuits, have concluded that the Congressional intent of using the term 
“cocaine base” rather than “crack” was to prevent limiting enhanced 
penalty applications to crack alone and thus “cocaine base” encompasses 
noncrack forms of cocaine base. Id. at 576. Finally, the Edwards court 
noted that the 1st Circuit first held that the statute only intended crack, 
“but on rehearing retreated from that position” to take a broader view of 
the term. Id. Ultimately, the 7th Circuit in Edwards reaffirmed that 
circuit’s holding in a previous case that “cocaine base” means “crack,” 
thereby agreeing with the 4th, 8th and 11th Circuits. Id. at 577. 
Plain-Error Review - United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325 
(11th Cir. 2005). 
In this case the 11th Circuit observed a split from the 6th Circuit on 
two different issues concerning an incorrect application of mandatory 
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sentencing by the district court. Id. at 1331 nn.7-8. First, the 11th Circuit 
disagreed with the 6th Circuit’s position that all incorrect applications of 
mandatory sentencing guidelines require remand, instead requiring that 
the sentenced party first “establish all four prongs of the plain-error test.” 
Id. at 1331 n.7. In the second split, the court diverged from the position 
of the 6th Circuit that “presumed prejudice” from the incorrect 
application. Id. at 1331 n.8. Alternatively, the court maintained “that a 
defendant has the burden to show actual prejudice in plain-error review.” 
Id. 
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